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JUDICIAL INPUT INTO POLICY FORMULATION:
CASE-SCENARIO ANALYSIS AND
EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAKING
Scenarios dramatize the issues and create pictures of the policy alterna-
tives available to decisionmakers. The author suggests that legal commen-
tators adopt a new technique, case-scenario analysis, as an additional step
in their traditional case analysis. Case-scenarios would enable the legal
system to add its perspective to those of other experts to aid legislators and
administrators making policy decisions. The author demonstrates the pro-
posed technique by applying it to compulsory education and the first amend-
ment.
I. UNDERSTANDING CASE-SCENARIO ANALYSIS
IMAGINE WHAT EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS will be like in the
year 2000. Will education still be compulsory? What limits will
judicial interpretations of the Federal Constitution impose upon a
state's power to set minimum educational standards? More particular-
ly, how will the balance be struck between the state educational
framework and the religious beliefs of the individual?
The tensions that exist between an individual's interest in particular
educational or religious values and the state's interest in having a
uniformly educated populace will have to be faced by the makers of
public policy, legislators and administrators.1 In formulating an educa-
tional framework to serve the needs of the state and its citizens,
policymakers must consult a number of disciplines. Professional edu-
cators, economists, demographers, and religious leaders are a sample
of those who may contribute to the design of an educational
framework. Policymakers also need to know the boundaries estab-
lished by the state and federal constitutions for setting educational
standards. This Note proposes that a new technique of legal analysis,
called "case-scenario analysis," be adopted by legal commentators 2 to
help persons who make policy decisions know what their legal options
are.
I. "Public policy" refers to governmental actions and viewpoints. It is, broadly
speaking, "whatever governments choose to do or not to do." T. DYE, UNDERSTANDING
PUBLIC POLICY 1 (1975).
2. The term "legal commentators" includes those-typically attorneys, judges in
their nonjudicial role, law professors, and law students-who, through articles in legal
journals, analyze and criticize judicial decisions.
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Scenario analysis enables policymakers to plan for the future
through probing the consequences of a course of action.3 Written by
experts with specialized training in a particular field, scenarios help
expose the relevant issues for policymakers whose knowledge and
experience in the field may be more general. If legal commentators
adopt the scenario technique, it will enable the legal system to add its
perspective to the perspective of other disciplines concerning the
possibilities for a particular statutory or regulatory area. Thus, policy-
makers would be assured not only the opportunity of considering the
policy alternatives that reflect the educational, social, and economic
pressures involved, but they would also be presented with the alterna-
tives (and the limits) suggested by relevant constitutional and legal
principles.
The use of legal decisions today is narrowly confined to defining
rules for dispute resolution. Courts are passive; they act only when a
dispute is brought before them by an individual or the government. 4
This should not, however, prevent legal scholars from assisting legis-
lators and administrators in their exploration of policy alternatives for
the future. Once a case is decided, scholars of the law should analyze
the decision and should provide the legal perspective for policymakers
who can later integrate this with inputs from other disciplines in their
future planning.
Case-scenario analysis simply adds an additional step to the tradi-
tional manner of reviewing decisions. Its first step mirrors the typical
case note or similar legal commentary. Case-scenario analysis then
goes one step further and suggests possible directions in which social
3. See generally SUBCOMMITrEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND ATMOSPHERE OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 94TH CONG., 2d SESS., LONG RANGE
PLANNING 419 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as LONG RANGE PLANNING]; H.
KAHN & A. WEINER, THE YEAR 2000, 262--64 (1967); Zentner, Scenarios in Forecasting,
33 CHEMICAL ENGINEERING NEWS 22, 23 (Oct. 1975); B. Carr, Scenario Writing 3 (Sept.
22, 1976) (unpublished paper presented at the Congressional Research Service training
program on Futures Research and Forecasting).
4. See P. MISHKIN & C. MORRIS, ON LAW IN COURTS 143-47 (1965). The scope of
judicial decisionmaking is further limited by the adversary system and by the doctrine of
stare decisis. The first limits judicial decisionmaking to the issues and viewpoints which
the disputants bring to the court's attention, and the second limits it to the reasonable
implications of previous decisions in the jurisdiction. Legislators and administrators, not
judges, debate the major policy questions. They are much better equipped to gather and
analyze the complex factual considerations bearing on broad questions of policy. Legis-
lative action is limited only by the state and federal constitutions and by political
practicalities. Consequently, a statutory or regulatory scheme reflects the resolution and
accommodation of a much broader spectrum of interests than a judicial opinion. Case-
scenario analysis permits commentators to bridge the gap between court and legislature
(or administrative agency) by utilizing the principles treated in judicial opinions as a
framework upon which to construct proposed legislation or regulation.
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activity can develop, taking into consideration the legal parameters set
by the decision. In this final step, legal scholars will create scenarios
that dramatize possible futures. This stage in case analysis is to be
distinguished from other parts of a commentary in which a decision is
studied for its present impacts on society and the determination of
principles of law for later cases. 5
In presenting this proposal the Note will first examine the theoret-
ical underpinnings of case-scenario analysis. Then the case-scenario
method will be applied to one area of public policy, compulsory
education; finally, three scenarios reflecting some of the available
policy choices will be presented.6
A. Scenario Analysis: Its Forecasting Feature
Scenario analysis is a type of forecasting. 7 It aids planners in
anticipating problems, initiating changes, and capitalizing on opportu-
nities. 8 Scenarios achieve this goal because they are created in groups
5. Rather than concerning itself with whether the rationale of a decision is substan-
tively correct or with whether the data used in making the decision is valid, case-scenario
analysis concentrates on transmitting the policy underpinnings and implications of judi-
cial opinions to legislators and administrators. Cf. LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 3,
at 420 ("The scenario writer may have three different goals: (1) to explore an issue; (2) to
teach something; or (3) to use the scenario as an analytic tool in policy analysis.").
6. For a better understanding of how case-scenario analysis would change the
traditional approach of legal commentators, compare this Note's discussion of the
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351
N.E.2d 750 (1976), decisions, notes 31-35 infra and accompanying text, with Knud-
sen, The Education of the Amish Child, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1506 (1974); Kurland, The
Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment Religion Clauses, 75
W. VA. L. REV. 433 (1973); 11 DUQ. L. REV. 433 (1973); 37 OHIO ST.L.J. 899 (1976); 18
VILL. L. REV. 955 (1973).
7. Economic and corporate planners use scenarios to suggest the contingencies to
which a comprehensive strategy must respond in the future. See Zentner, supra note 3,
at 29. Zentner cautions the scenario writer against creating scenarios that "sound like a
forecast" since scenarios of that kind cease to be useful to the planner "when the future
turns out not to coincide exactly with [the] script." Id. at 30. He describes scenario
analysis as "strategic planning" in order to dispel any impression that scenarios should
strive to accurately predict the future. Thus, in Zentner's view, "[sitrategic planning is
necessary precisely because we cannot forecast." Id. at 23.
Similarly, Herman Kahn, one of the pioneers of the scenario technique, emphasizes
that: "One must remember that the scenario is not used as a predictive device ....
Imagination has always been one of the principal means for dealing. . . with the future,
and the scenario is simply one of many devices useful in stimulating and disciplining the
imagination." H. KAHN & A. WEINER, supra note 3, at 264. For a discussion of other
planning methodologies, see LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 3, at 382-418, 434-73.
8. Planners of public policy have used scenarios to stimulate thought about alterna-
tive approaches to issues under consideration, and to suggest the contingencies which
may arise. See Zentner, supra note 3, at 29. The scenario method has been used most
often in contingency planning where the planners' key decisions would be made in the
1978]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
and they approach an issue from several extremes, enabling planners to
debate the issues with an appreciation of the consequences of present
decisions. 9 Each scenario conveys a narrative portrait of the kind of
world likely to emerge should policymakers adopt the policy choice
underlying that particular scenario. 10 More specifically, a scenario
portrays a "consistent, well-researched and detailed set of circum-
stances that is sufficiently plausible to allow the reader to understand
the situations, conditions and strategies that prevail."'I
For example, if the originators of American educational policies
had used scenarios to explore the alternatives available, they might
have begun by debating three simple scenarios. 12
Scenario One: Education is controlled by the federal government.
All standards are established by Congress and federal administrative
agencies. The goal of education is to provide upward mobility in a
democratic society. Thus, it is essential that federal schools be avail-
able to all youth. Although attendance at federal schools is not manda-
tory, federal funding is available only to federal schools; private
schools must be financially independent.
future upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of some future event. See, e.g., Zentner,
supra note 3, at 30-31. The strategic scenario "focus[es] attention on causal processes
and decision points" to highlight the "alternatives [that] exist for each actor at each step,
for preventing, diverting, or facilitating the process." H. KAHN & A. WIENER, supra
note 3, at 6.
Scenarios for policy analysis--of which case-scenarios would be an example-
facilitate decisions that will be made in the immediate future. The forecasting feature of
policy scenarios, as opposed to strategic scenarios, is manifest in their projection of the
probable consequences and implications of a contemporaneous decision. While
scenarios for contingency planning suggest the variety of consequences implicit in
present trends that will require future decisions, the scenarios for policy planners
discussed in this Note portray the consequences of present decisions and the various
trends that may result. Case-scenarios use judicial opinions to contour and circumscribe
the available choices. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRI. OFFICE OF PLANNING AND EVALUATION
FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON AGRI. AND FORESTRY, 94TH CONG., lsT SEss., ALTERNATIVE
FUTURES FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE 1-2 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as ALTERNA-
TIVE FUTURES] (applying policy scenarios to national agricultural planning).
9. It is recognized that decisions made today will shape the future, yet systems of
assessing the implications of present trends, designing and evaluating alternative courses
of action to avoid future problems, or to realize future opportunities are rarely used. But
see Mayo & Jones, Legal-Policy Decision Process: Alternative Thinking and the Predic-
tive Function, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 318, 322 (1964). Congress has begun to explore
the means of expanding policy planning horizons to strengthen the government's capac-
ity to deal with the future. Scenarios have been used to provide this type of input. LONG
RANGE PLANNING, supra note 3, at 391, 419-33; ALTERNATIVE FUTURES, supra note 8.
10. Zentner, supra note 3, at 31.
11. LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 3, at 419 (apparently quoting without refer-
ence, B. Carr, supra note 3, at I).
12. These scenarios are not representative case-scenarios but are created for the
purpose of demonstrating the scenario method.
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Scenario Two: Schools are state controlled. Each state sets its own
goals and educational standards. Each state determines whether there
should be compulsory attendance or state financing of private schools.
In developing its educational policy, each state should keep in mind
that equal educational opportunity is a national goal, and that mastery
of basic academic skills (reading and writing) is necessary for a citizen
to function in society.
Scenario Three: Education is a private matter. Parents are free to
determine whether any schooling is necessary for their children. Nei-
ther the federal nor the state governments are involved in the educa-
tional process. One of the fundamental goals of society is to allow
diverse groups of individuals to maintain their own traditions, cultures,
and special interests. If parents want their children to be formally
educated they can design their own curricula and organize their own
schools.
These scenarios encompass the historical stages and debates over
school policies.13 They raise numerous questions for the planner. Who
should control educational policy? What are the goals of American
education? What curricula are necessary? Should schooling be manda-
tory? Finally, who should finance educational programs? Rather than
stating the specific issues, though, the scenarios create pictures of the
alternatives.
The case-scenario method is preferable to other means of providing
legal input to policymakers because it is not limited to specific facts. 14
Scenarios "stretch the mind" and consider the variations of a situa-
tion. The only limits of scenarios are that they have some utility, that
they remain relevant, credible, and intelligible. 15 The alternatives
13. For discussions of the development of educational policies, see generally Kur-
land, supra note 6, at 213-18; Sugarman & Kipp, Rethinking Collective Responsibility for
Education, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 144 (1975); Tyack, Ways of Seeing:An Essay on the
History of Compulsory Schooling, 46 HARv. EDUC. REV. 355 (1976); Project, Education
and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 MicH. L. REv. 1373 (1976); Note,
Freedom and Public Education: The Needfor New Standards, 50 NoTRE DAME LAW. 530
(1975).
14. Traditionally the legal viewpoint is presented to policymakers in a legal brief.
The brief begins with a given set of facts and describes the legal implications of a single,
narrowly circumscribed, factual situation. A brief is written only after a proposed public
policy has already been constructed; the legal theories are then applied to the facts.
Consequently, the brief is useful only after the policymaker has decided upon a course
of action; it merely advises him of the legality of the plan. Case-scenario analysis, in
contrast, permits legal theories to present the full variety of possible alternatives. See
LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 3, at 420.
15. Id. at 421-24; Zentner, supra note 3, at 30; B. Carr, supra note 3, at 4, 6.
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should be linked to the real world, so that images are created that
people can perceive as desirable or undesirable. If a scenario is plau-
sible and understandable as a future event or policy, then it is a useful
tool for planners. 16
It must be remembered that case-scenario analysis presents the
issues that have been brought before a judicial forum during the
resolution of a conflict. While a finished scenario would be an interdis-
ciplinary effort, this Note focuses on case-scenario analysis, introduc-
ing a process by which legal data can be presented in a manner useful
to the makers of public policy. The case-scenarios are only one
subcomponent of the entire policy formulation. For planners to devel-
op policies that meet the needs of future society they must have input
from many specialized areas and it is clear that the interpretations and
recommendations of legal commentators are necessary and valuable. 17
In summation, case-scenario analysis makes use of judicial deci-
sions as barometers for forecasting. A judicial opinion can be utilized
for interpreting the many pressures underlying that case. Well
constructed case-scenarios by legal commentators should contribute to
deliberations over what policies to adopt for the future. Case-scenario
analysis will permit input from judicial opinions to be channeled into
the legislative and administrative process.
B. Designing Case-Scenarios
The term scenario is borrowed from the theater, where it refers to
the outline or synopsis of a play. 8 In many ways the policymaking
scenario reflects its theatrical origins. The structural components of
scenarios are actors, events, choices, decisions, and consequences. 19
In the context of educational policymaking, the policymakers are the
actors faced with an event: the formulation of educational policies and
16. Mr. Carr suggests that scenarios might be used to present issues to committees at
the beginning of a session of Congress. They would be used to surface the issues and to
identify the research needs for those issues which are endorsed by the committees. He
also states that they can be useful in the analysis of legislative proposals. B. Carr, supra
note 3, at 9. Case-scenarios written by legal commentators could easily be used in these
situations.
17. It is probable that not all educationally, psychologically, economically, or
sociologically feasible educational policies will be within the law. This provides a
compelling reason for the use of case-scenarios. Policymakers need to know the bounds
of the law, and case-scenarios provide that information.
18. LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 3, at 419; Zentner, supra note 3, at 23; B.
Carr, supra note 3, at 1.
19. As Mr. Carr states: "Scenarios are made up of actors, who when involved with
events, are faced with choices and must make decisions which lead to consequences.
The cycle repeats itself throughout the scenario." B. Carr, supra note 3, at 2 (emphasis
original). Accord, ALTERNATIVE FUTURES, supra note 8, at 1.
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the implementation of their plans. The policymakers choose among a
number of alternatives, making decisions which ultimately result in a
consequence: an educational policy. 20 Scenarios used in strategic plan-
ning or "crisis management" cast the future in the form of a concrete
narrative to help identify the decisions that will have to be made in the
future. 21 Case-scenarios dramatize the future for a somewhat different
reason; they highlight the consequences and legal limitations as-
sociated with decisions which confront the policymaker. Case-
scenarios reduce abstract legal conclusions to concrete images.
Case-scenarios, like all scenarios, should be created in a group; a
set of three is usually sufficient to present the range of possibilities. 22
The scenarios should be set up as a scale in which two polar plans are
presented with a third plan falling in between the other two. The
middle plan is called the "baseline" scenario.23 It asks the question:
"If we keep going at this rate, where will we end up?" 24 The polar
scenarios, referred to as the "outer boundaries,"25 ask the question: "I
wonder what would happen if ? . . ."26 Given these viewpoints,
planners can debate the issues. Their ultimate choice may be a plan
falling between the baseline and one of the outer boundaries.
Case-scenarios will appear as adjuncts to traditional legal commen-
tary. Thus, before creating the case-scenarios, the legal commentator
will conduct the usual analysis of a judicial decision (or group of
decisions) including a discussion of the past legal developments and a
definition of the issues contained within the case. This preliminary
section links the scenarios to the law.
In the scenario section of a case-scenario analysis, a theme should
be developed. It should reflect clearly the issues and policy considera-
tions upon which the scenarios are based. The themes of case-
scenarios are necessarily somewhat broader than the precise factual
holdings of the individual cases, for they may involve issues implied
by the court's opinion as well as those which the court has clearly
articulated. The outer-boundary scenarios are designed to encourage
20. A scenario may be aptly described as "a motion picture, not a snapshot." It is an
"ongoing dynamic process" leading up to an end state, the alternative future. B. Carr,
supra note 3, at 2.
21. See note 8 supra.
22. Zentner, supra note 3, at 31. Three scenarios are optimal because "most users
have great difficulty in keeping track of four or more scenarios at one time" and "two
scenarios would not do a decent job of displaying all the alternatives." LONG RANGE
PLANNING, supra note 3, at 422.
23. LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 3, at 422.
24. B. Carr, supra note 3, at 2. See LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 3, at 454.
25. LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 3, at 422-23.
26. B. Carr, supra note 3, at 2.
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consideration of a broad range of alternative approaches to problems of
public policy. A set of case-scenarios-such as those designed for
educational policymaking-dealing with constitutional issues may
freely "stretch the mind," so long as each scenario makes clear, and
respects, the relevant constitutional limits.27 Each case-scenario should
be given equal weight, so that no single scenario in the set seems more
probable or more attractive than the others. 28 Effective scenarios sug-
gest a number of equally plausible policy approaches. 29 Policymakers
alone should decide which plan or combination of plans should be
chosen.
Scenarios by their very nature possess a limited useful life: "The
process of obsolescence begins from the moment most scenarios are
written. '30 Case-scenarios are no exception to this observation, par-
ticularly where they are based upon decisions in rapidly changing areas
of the law. Therefore, case-scenarios need to be continually revised to
reflect recent developments in the law, giving due recognition to new
issues and policy considerations and updating or perhaps even discard-
ing issues and considerations which are no longer relevant.
In the next section of this Note, scenario analysis will be-demon-
strated through its application to two cases dealing with state compul-
sory attendance laws. Scenarios will then be developed around the
concerns of compulsory educational policy and the constitutional stan-
dards of religious freedom. For purposes of demonstration only, this
Note will conclude with an additional section, following the scenarios,
27. See LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 3, at 422.
28. Perhaps the single biggest problem encountered in the introduction of
scenarios into the planning process is that most planners, used to a one-line
projection of the future, have a difficult time coming to grips with several
futures. We [scenario writers] compound the problem somewhat by emphasiz-
ing that all scenarios have equal probabilities, so that no single scenario is to be
preferred over its alternatives, or is labeled "most probable."
Zentner, supra note 3, at 30. Accord, LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 3, at 423; B.
Carr, supra note 3, at 5.
Case-scenarios, of course, must present plausible analyses of the judicial decision or
decisions on which they are based. In order to ensure each scenario is given equal
weight, the scenarios themselves should not cite primary or secondary sources for
authority, and all historical baclground and legal analysis should be incorporated in the
actual case analysis. See LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 3, at 423 (citing B. Carr,
supra note 3, at 5). For similar reasons the scenarios within a set should be equally
detailed and of equal length. See Zentner, supra note 3, at 31; B. Carr, supra note 3, at 5.
29. Cf. LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 3, at 423 (quoting B. Carr, supra note 3,
at 5) ("In view of the large number of possible future outcomes, each and any specific
scenario has a low probability of occurrence.").
30. LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 3, at 432 (quoting B. Carr, supra note 3, at
5). Accord, ALTERNATIVE FUTURES, supra note 8, at 91.
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illustrating how the scenarios grew out of the legal discussion which
preceded them.
II. CASE-SCENARIO ANALYSIS APPLIED TO COMPULSORY EDUCATION
AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. Introduction
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,31 and State v. Whisner,32 the courts faced
the problems posed by the conflicting interests involved in compulsory
education laws and the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 33
These interests include the state's interest in education and in assuring
educational standards are met, the individual's interest in receiving an
education with certain values-such as those that foster certain reli-
gious beliefs, and the parents' interest in choosing the type of educa-
tion their child should receive. In Yoder and Whisner the courts found
the states' compulsory education laws were limited by the parents'
right to act in accordance with their religious beliefs, a right protected
by the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
Although the Yoder and Whisner decisions followed directly from
the development of the free exercise guarantee of the first amend-
ment34 and from a number of decisions involving similar clashes
between the interests of the state and the individual, neither decision
set absolute standards defining permissible educational policy. Rather,
both courts weighed the state's interest against the constitutional inter-
est35 of the parent, and in each case the balance tipped in favor of the
latter. Therefore, even after Yoder and Whisner, a question remains
concerning the shape of future educational policy. By developing a set
of scenarios from the assumptions, issues, and innovations in the two
decisions, a commentator can provide policymakers with a perspective
on the constitutional considerations and limitations affecting educa-
tional policy. This section of the Note, therefore, presents a discussion
of the legal developments prior to Yoder and Whisner and an analysis
of the decisions themselves. Like any traditional case analysis, this
section reflects contemporary judicial understanding of the appropriate
balance to strike between the competing interests involved.
31. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
32. 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. See notes 57-104 infra and accompanying text.
35. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-34 (1972); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St.
2d 181, 205-18, 351 N.E.2d 750, 764-72 (1976).
19781
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
B. Legal Developments Prior to Yoder and Whisner
1. The State's Interest in Education
Through its system of education a state attempts to guarantee that
its citizens do not become liabilities to society. By requiring a
minimum level of academic competence the state encourages its citi-
zens to achieve economic self-sufficiency, political literacy, and an
understanding of social norms.36 The courts have never disputed a
state's interest in education, 37 nor have they ever challenged a state's
authority to enact legislation 38 and promulgate reasonable regulations
to promote this interest. 39
The history of compulsory school attendance reflects the increased
involvement of the states in education. Prior to 1890, in the "symbolic
stage," states passed compulsory attendance legislation but little was
done to assure compliance. n0 From 1890 through the present, the
"bureaucratic stage," has developed; school attendance has been
enforced and policies have been developed to mandate certain educa-
tional standards. 4
36. Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 MICH.
L. REV. 1373, 1373, 1384-85 (1976). "The state seeks through its educational system to
achieve two goals: the development of the basic reading, writing, and other academic
skills that any productive member of society must possess; and the inculcation of values
deemed essential for a cohesive, harmonious, and law-abiding society." Id. at 1373.
37. The Federal Constitution is silent on the matter of education. Therefore, the
power of the states to regulate education derives from the reserved powers clause of the
tenth amendment. Id. at 1375 n.4. See U.S. CONsT. amend. X ("The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."). As one commentator has noted:
"The police power was extended beyond its original limits to include the regulation of
education because it was believed that in a democratic society the public welfare of the
community depended upon the intelligence and moral virtues of its citizens." Note,
Freedom and Public Education: The Need for New Standards, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW.
530, 532 (1975).
38. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 3205-11 (McKinney 1970 & Cum. Ann. Pocket
Part 1977-1978); OHfo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3321.01-.13, 3321.38, 3321.99 (Page 1972
& Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (West Cum. Ann. Pocket Part 1977-1978).
Mississippi is the only state without compulsory education. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 226 n.15 (1972); Sugarman & Kirp, supra note 13, at 198 n.160.
39. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923). Accord, Kurland, supra note 6, at 217. Cf. State
v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976) (excessive accreditation require-
ments for nonpublic schools unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments).




Recently, however, critics of educational policies have attacked
state compulsory attendance laws calling for their repeal. 42 Challen-
gers contend that compulsory education laws cannot be justified,
especially where there is substantial infringement of an individual's
constitutional rights, such as religious freedom.
2. Parents' Right to Control the Education of Their Children
In a series of three decisions in the 1920's the Supreme Court
recognized the right of parents to provide their child with a nonpublic
education as a fundamental liberty under the fifth43 and fourteenth
amendments.' In Meyer v. Nebraska45 the Court reversed the convic-
tion of a parochial schoolteacher for teaching the German language
after finding that a state statute prohibiting foreign language instruction
was unconstitutional. Although the Court recognized the state's inter-
est in education, and its power to compel attendance to further this
interest, 46 the Nebraska statute infringed upon the fourteenth amend-
ment liberties of the schoolteacher to teach a language other than
English and the "natural right of the parent to give his children
education suitable to their station in life." 47
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters48 a private corporation involved in
both secular and religious education through the operation of parochial
schools and a military academy brought an action to enjoin the en-
forcement of the Oregon compulsory attendance law which required
42. See, e.g., Sugarman & Kirp, supra note 13, at 217 n.223. Cf. Shane, Education
for Tomorrow's World, THE FUTruRsT, June 1973, at 103 (emphasizing the destandardi-
zation of education).
43. "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
44. "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
45. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
46. Id. at 400-01. The Court rejected the state's parens patriae argument:
[T]here seems to be no adequate foundation for the suggestion that the purpose
was to protect the child's health by limiting his mental activities. It is well
known that proficiency in a foreign language seldom comes to one not instruct-
ed at an early age, and experience shows that this is not injurious to the health,
morals or understanding of the ordinary child.
Id.
47. Id. at 400. Although under a narrow reading the case rests solely on the teacher's
liberty, Meyer has also been cited to support parental liberty. See text accompanying
note 51 supra. The Court in Meyer broadly construed fourteenth amendment liberties:
Without doubt, [the liberty guaranteed] denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience. ...
Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
48. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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attendance in public schools. Although the Court's decision in Pierce
was ambiguous and therefore subject to a number of interpretations, 49
it seems clear that "the present vitality of the case now rests on the
parents' personal substantive due process rights,''50 which the Court
articulated in the following, often cited passage:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska,. .. we think
it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the up-
bringing and education of children under their control. As
often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the
Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency
of the State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which
all governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them
to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is
not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obliga-
tions. 5'
Pierce, therefore, reaffirmed the right of parents to direct the educa-
tional upbringing of their child that had been recognized in Meyer.52
Farrington v. Tokushige53 was an action to enjoin the enforcement
of a Hawaii statute severely restricting the operation of foreign lan-
guage schools.-' The Court's decision reflects its prior opinions in
Meyer and Pierce:
[T]he school Act and the measures adopted thereunder go far
beyond mere regulation of privately-supported schools
49. Professor Arons believes that under the same facts Pierce today would be
decided on first amendment grounds. Arons, The Separation of School and State: Pierce
Reconsidered, 46 HARV. EDUC. REv. 76, 96-99 (1976). But see Project, supra note 36, at
1395 & nn. 110-15 (Pierce based solely on fourteenth amendment due process grounds).
Professor Kurland rejects any argument that Pierce rests on constitutional footing,
particularly the first amendment. Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education,
and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REV. 213, 218-20 (1973).
Rather, Pierce concerned only "the improper interference with the business and pro-
prietary interests of the two corporations that would have been put out of business if the
statute had been allowed to become effective." Id. at 219.
50. Project, supra note 36, at 1395.
51. 268 U.S. at 534-35.
52. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
53. 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
54. The statute required the school and its instructors to be certified by the terri-
tory's Department of Instruction; empowered the Department of Instruction to prescribe
curriculum, textbooks, and admission criteria; prohibited the operation of a foreign
language school during the hours of public school operation; and limited the number of




where children obtain instruction deemed valuable by their
parents and which is not obviously in conflict with any public
interest. They give affirmative direction concerning the inti-
mate and essential details of such schools, intrust their
control to public officers, and deny both owners and patrons
reasonable choice and discretion in respect of teachers, cur-
riculum and text-books. Enforcement of the Act. . . would
deprive parents of fair opportunity to procure for their chil-
dren instruction which they think important and we cannot
say is harmful.55
Farrington again confirmed the rights of parents to direct the educa-
tional upbringing of their children and limited the state's interest.5 6
Moreover, although Meyer and Pierce recognized that parental liberty
is meaningless unless private institutions provide an alternative to the
state's public schools, Farrington went one step further and insisted
the alternative remain free of undue state interference.
The trilogy of Meyer, Pierce, and Farrington establishes a number
of principles: a state possesses a legitimate interest in the education of
its citizens and may effect its goals by reasonable regulation-namely
compulsory attendance laws and minimum standards. However, the
state interest and corresponding regulatory power are limited by the
parental right to direct the educational upbringing of the child and the
correlative need for independent, educational alternatives necessary to
make the parental right meaningful.
3. The Free Exercise Guarantee of the First Amendment
The right to hold a particular religious belief, and act in accordance
with that belief, 57 is guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitu-
55. Id. at 298.
56. Since Hawaii was a territory at the time Farrington came before the Court, the
statute was challenged under the fifth amendment. See note 43 supra. The Court,
however, had no trouble extending the liberties recognized by Meyer and Pierce under
the fourteenth amendment, to the fifth amendment's due process guarantee, 273 U.S. at
298-99.
57. The Supreme Court initially created a belief-action distinction, holding that only
religious belief was protected under the first amendment. E.g., Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333 (1890) (religious belief in polygamy cannot be pled as a justification for criminal
action); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (Mormon practice of polygamy
not protected against criminal sanctions by the first amendment). Subsequent decisions
have, however, obliterated the belief-action distinction. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 219-20 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). See
Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-05 (1961). See generally Giannella, Religious
Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part I. The Religious Liberty
Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. RaV. 1381, 1387-88 (1967). In fact, action in accordance with
one's belief may demonstrate the legitimacy of that belief. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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tion: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ,5
In an action raising a first amendment claim the initial inquiry is
whether the belief or action allegedly burdened by governmental action
can be classified as a "religion" within the meaning of the first
amendment. 59 In two Selective Service cases, United States v. See-
ger6° and Welch v. United States,61 the Court has given a broad
definition to "religion.'"62 The petitioner in Seeger had tried to qualify
for a Selective Service exemption available to individuals who were
conscientiously opposed to war because of "religious training and
58. U.S. CoNsr. amend 1. Both clauses of the first amendment have been applied to
the states through the fourteenth amendment: the establishment clause in Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947), and the free exercise clause in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Kurland, supra note 49, at 241. Both commen-
tators and the courts have recognized the religion clauses as stating a single precept.
E.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1452-53 (9th ed. 1975); P. KURLAND, RELIGION
AND THE LAW 112 (1962). See Kurland, supra note 49, at 241. Nevertheless, perhaps
recognizing the potential tensions underlying the establishment proscription and the free
exercise guarantee, the courts have generally examined individual cases in terms of
either the establishment or free exercise clause, but not both. See, e.g., Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (state aid to parochial school students tested against the
establishment clause); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state compulsory
attendance law tested against the free exercise guarantee); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (state law requiring Bible reading and recitation of the
Lord's Prayer by public school pupils tested against the establishment clause). See
generally Giannella, supra note 57, at 1388-96. In the cases involving state compulsory
attendance laws and minimum standards, the focus has been on the free exercise clause.
E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181,351
N.E.2d 750 (1976). But see State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 443-45, 182 N.W.2d 539,
545-46 (1971), aff'd sub. nom. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). It should be
noted that in Yoder the Court disposed of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's establish-
ment clause concerns in a footnote. 406 U.S. at 234 n.22. This Note will therefore focus
its attention on that aspect of the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of religion.
(One should not, however, ignore the establishment clause issues raised by these cases.
Professor Kurland, for example, has read the Court's reasoning in Yoder to open the
door to the constitutional permissibility of aid to parochial school students, an area
traditionally limited to non-establisment concerns. Kurland, supra note 49, at 242-43.)
59. This may even be the case where the religion is an ostensibly well-established
religion, such as the Amish religion in Yoder. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-18
(1972). See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 398 n.1 (1963); State v. Whisner, 47
Ohio St. 2d 181, 199-200, 351 N.E.2d 750, 761-62 (1976).
60. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
61. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
62. The spirit of Seeger and Welch is also found in United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78 (1944), where the Court held that the free exercise guarantee barred a jury from
deciding the sincerity of the defendant's belief: "Men may believe what they cannot
prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious




belief.''63 The Court interpreted the statute and its references to reli-
gion broadly:
We have concluded that Congress, in using the expression
"Supreme Being" rather than the designation "God," was
merely clarifying the meaning of religious training and belief
so as to embrace all religions and to exclude all essentially
political, sociological and philosophical views. We believe
that under this construction, the test of belief "in relation to
a Supreme Being" is whether a given belief that is sincere
and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one
who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs
have parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders
we cannot say that one is 'in relation to a Supreme Being"
and the other is not.64
Presented with facts similar to those in Seeger, the plurality opinion in
Welch broadly defined the term "religious":
If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs that are
purely ethical or moral in source and content but that
nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to re-
frain from participating in any war at any time, those beliefs
certainly occupy in the life of that individual "a place paral-
lel to that filled by . . .God" in traditionally religious per-
sons.
65
Although Seeger and Welch were cases of statutory interpretation and
did not concern the first amendment, the broad reading of religion
indicates the term will not be limited to organized religions but will
extend to any belief which is sincerely held.66
Once the first amendment religion interest is established, the indi-
vidual must show that the challenged governmental action directly or
indirectly burdens the free exercise of that religion. 67 The test for
determining whether the free exercise clause has been violated was
developed in Sherbert v. Verner,68 where South Carolina was required
to recognize a citizen's religious convictions in awarding her unem-
ployment compensation when she refused to work on the Sabbath day
63. Selective Service Act of 1948, § 60), 62 Stat. 612-13 (current version at 50
U.S.C. § 456(j) (1970)).
64. 380 U.S. at 165-66.
65. 398 U.S. at 340. It should be noted that in 1967, between the Court's decisions in
Seeger and Welch, Congress amended the Selective Service Act, deleting the reference
to a "belief in a relation to a Supreme Being." G. GUNTHER, supra note 58, at 1527 n. 1.
66. See J. Calhoun, The Aftermath of the Amish Case, in FRONTIERS IN SCHOOL LAW
53, 57-59 (National Organization on Legal Problems of Education 1973); note 62 supra.
67. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), with Braunfield v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599 (1961).
68. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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of her faith. The Sherbert Court used a balancing test and required a
compelling state interest to justify the intrusion on the individual's first
amendment right. 69 State compulsory attendance laws present a situa-
tion similar to the one manifested in Sherbert: the parents of a school-
age child may be forced to choose between following their religious
beliefs and facing a criminal sanction under the compulsory education
law, and complying with the law and therefore violating the tenets of
their faith.
Prior to Sherbert, in Prince v. Massachusetts,70 the state's interest
in protecting children prevailed over the individual's interest in free-
dom of religion. In Prince, the Supreme Court found that it was not a
violation of the free exercise clause to prosecute a mother for violating
a child labor law. The mother had allowed her child to sell religious
magazines on public streets for the Jehovah's Witnesses:
We think that with reference to the public proclaiming of
religion, upon the streets and in other similar public places,
the power of the state to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults, as is
true in the case of other freedoms, and the rightful boundary
of its power has not been crossed in this case.71
Thus, prior to Yoder and Whisner the Court had recognized a
state's interest in education, but had limited this interest by the parental
right to direct the child's education. Independent of the educational
sphere, the Court had also broadly interpreted the term religion,
requiring a compelling state interest to justify infringement of first
amendment, free exercise rights. The discussion will now focus upon
Yoder and Whisner in an attempt to determine how far the state can go
in setting educational standards without impermissibly interfering with
individual freedoms.
69. The Sherbert Court's requirement of a compelling state interest was a definite
step away from its prior holding in Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (decided
only two years earlier) in which a majority of- the Court had required little more than a
reasonable relation between the regulation and a legitimate state purpose: "I]f the State
regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of
which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect
burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means
which do not impose such a burden." 366 U.S. at 607 (citation omitted).
The Sherbert Court did not expressly state whether the burden of proving a compel-
ling state interest was upon the state or whether the burden was on the complainant to
show a lack of a compelling state interest. However, language in the opinion strongly
suggests the former. See 374 U.S. at 406-07. Professor Kurland reads Yoder as laying
the matter to rest by placing the burden squarely on the state. Kurland, supra note 49, at
231-33 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972)). The language of the
Court's opinion supports his conclusion. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-34
(1972).
70. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
71. Id. at 170.
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C. Wisconsin v. Yoder: Compulsory Attendance and
Secondary Educational Policy
Before 1972, the Supreme Court refused to review cases challeng-
ing the validity of compulsory education laws under the free exercise
clause. 72 State courts which had passed on the issue had generally
upheld the state laws. 73 Finally, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,74 the Court
granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of Wisconsin's law
requiring formal, compulsory education until the age of sixteen. 75
In Yoder the parents of three Anish youth were convicted of
violating the compulsory education law76 when they refused to send
their children to school, believing that education beyond the eighth
grade was "contrary to the Amish religion and way of life."' 77 In order
to determine whether the statute was constitutional the Court examined
the educational goals of the state and their impact on the religious
interests of the individual. 78 The friction between the state's education
law and the beliefs of the Amish people arose from the educational
policies advanced by the State which were not in harmony with the
respondents' religious values. 79 Formal secondary education, the par-
72. State v. Garber, 197 Kan. 567, 419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51
(1967); State ex. rel. Shoreline School Dist. v. Superior Court, 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346 P.2d
999, cert. denied sub nom., Wold v. Shoreline School Dist., 363 U.S. 814 (1960).
73. E.g., Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964); Mosier v. Barren
County Bd. of Health, 308 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (1948); Commonwealth v. Reufrew,
332 Mass. 492, 126 N.E.2d 109 (1955); People v. Donner, 302 N.Y. 857, 100 N.E.2d 48
(1951); State v. Hershberger, 103 Ohio App. 188, 144 N.E.2d 693 (1955).
74. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
75. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.15(1)(a) (West 1973), reprinted in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 207 n.2 (1972).
76. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.15(5) (West 1973), reprinted in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 207 n.2 (1972): "Whoever violates this section. . . may be fined not less than
$5 nor more than $50 or imprisoned not more than 3 months or both." Id.
77. 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972). "They believed that by sending their children to high
school, they would not only expose themselves to the danger of the censure of the
church community, but, as found by the county court, also endanger their own salvation
and that of their children." Id.
78. 406 U.S. at 209-13.
79. The respondents did not object to the state's requirement of compulsory elemen-
tary education,
because they agree that their children must have basic skills in the 'three R's' in
order to read the Bible, to be good farmers and citizens and to be able to deal
with non-Amish people when necessary in the course of daily affairs. They
view such basic education as acceptable because it does not significantly
expose their children to worldly values or interfere with their development in
the Amish community during their crucial adolescent period. While Amish
accept compulsory elementary education generally, wherever possible they
have established their own elementary schools in many respects like the small
local schools of the past.
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ents argued, had an adverse impact upon the continued viability of the
Amish community and conflicted with their basic religious tenets.80
The Court's analysis, determining that the Amish religion was
entitled to the protection of the first amendment, suggests several
elements for policymakers to note. First, the Supreme Court recog-
nized a distinction between religious values and philosophical and
personal values.81 The Court also understood that the faith of a reli-
gious group and its mode of life can be inseparable and interdepen-
dent.82 Third, the free exercise clause may be offended even though
the state made no direct attempt to discriminate against religious
beliefs.8 3
Balancing the state's interest in universal compulsory education
and the individual's interest in religious freedom,8 4 the Court discussed
another set of factors relevant for planners: the Amish informal educa-
tion (which continued after eighth grade) met the goals of compulsory
education,8 5 and there was not a substantial state interest in requiring
formal education after the eighth grade. 86 Thus, the Court measured
Id. at 212. See generally Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual
Rights, 74 MicH. L. REv. 1373, 1398 (1976). The respondents' objection focused on the
two years of secondary schooling required by the Wisconsin law:
They object to the high school, and higher education generally, because the
values they teach are in marked variance with Amish values and the Amish way
of life; they view secondary school education as an impermissible exposure of
their children to a "worldly" influence in conflict with their beliefs. The high
school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-
distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other stu-
dents. Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing; a life of
"goodness," rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical
knowledge; community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from,
rather than integration with, contemporary worldly society.
406 U.S. at 210-11.
80. Id. at 216-18.
81. The Court found the facts presented supported the Amish contention that their
values were "rooted in religious belief," and that the "'worldly' influences" of second-
ary education do interfere with the religious practices of the Amish community. Id. at
215-17.
82. Id. at 215-16, 219-20. See note 57 supra.
83. 406 U.S. at 220.
84. After finding that a bona fide religious belief did exist the Court stated that a
balancing of state and individual interests must take place. Citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963), and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944), Chief Justice
Burger stated:
[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. We can accept it
as settled, therefore, that, however strong the State's interest in universal
compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordina-
tion of all other interests.
406 U.S. at 215.




education by its ability to prepare children for their adult respon-
sibilities,8 7 and found vocational training after the age of fourteen to be
a valuable educational experience.88 Moreover, while the Court noted
that the State has the right to establish reasonable standards for all
education programs, 89 the State was unable to convince the Court that
more than a basic education is necessary to prepare citizens for partici-
pation in our society.90 All of these conclusions are innovations; the
Court has never before reached these conclusions about educational
policies and the constitutional limits placed upon them. 91
D. State v. Whisner: An Interpretation of
Elementary Educational Policy
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Whisner,92 faced the issue
whether some of the minimum standards promulgated by the Ohio
State Board of Education under the compulsory education laws93 were
87. Thomas Jefferson pointed out early in our history, that some degree of
education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelli-
gently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and indepen-
dence. Further, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-suffi-
cient participants in society. We accept these propositions.
Id. at 221.
88. The Amish were not contesting secondary education but were arguing that their
system of secondary education, "learning-by-doing," was just as good if not better than
formal schooling at that stage of life. The Court found that the Amish qualities of
"reliability, self-reliance and dedication" provided enough assurance that even youth
who left the Amish community would find work in the market place. Id. at 224. Chief
Justice Burger stated that the state of Wisconsin had a "mistaken assumption" when it
argued that the Amish would allow their children to grow in "ignorance" if they did not
attend secondary schools, because the Amish provided an "ideal" vocational education
for their adolescents. Id. at 224.
89. Specifically, the Yoder Court suggested that the state could set standards for the
Amish youth's vocational education program:
The States have had a long history of amicable and effective relationships with
church-sponsored schools, and there is no basis for assuming that, in this
related context, reasonable standards cannot be established concerning the
content of the continuing vocational education of Amish children under par-
ental guidance.
Id. at 221.
90. Id. at 225. The Yoder Court indicated that youth are "capable of fulfilling the
social and political responsibilities of citizenship without compelled attendance beyond
the eighth grade .. " Id. at 225. This implies that primary schooling is backed by a
compelling state interest. Id. at 236.
91. In the words of Philip Kurland "Wisconsin v. Yoder is, without doubt, an
innovative opinion, whether it will also prove to be a seminal one remains to be seen."
Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education and the First Amendment's Reli-
gion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 213, 231 (1973).
92. 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976).
93. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3321.01-.13, 3321.38, 3321.99 (Page 1972 & Supp.
1976). At the time § 3321.03 read:
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unconstitutional because they infringed upon the free exercise of reli-
gion. The challenge was based on the first and fourteenth amendments
of the Federal Constitution, and on section seven, article one of the
Ohio constitution.
In Whisner, the parents were members of the Christian Tabernacle
Church. Because the public schools provided an unsatisfactory reli-
gious education, the parents formed a church school hiring a state
certified teacher. According to one of the standards prescribed by the
State Board of Education, an application for a charter had to be filed;
the charter would be granted when all minimum standards were met.
The appellants did not apply for a charter.
The court cited Yoder to the effect that: "There is no doubt as to
the power of a state, having high responsibility for education of its
citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration
of basic education." 94 Justice Celebrezze noted that the parents were
not attacking the compulsory education laws on their face; nor did they
argue that the state did not have the power to promulgate and enforce
reasonable regulations for nonpublic schools. 95 Examining the appel-
lants' free exercise claim the court first applied the Ballard and Seeger
tests. 96 Uncontradicted evidence proved that the Christian parents'
religious beliefs were sincere and "truly held": "[T]hese appellants
are God-fearing people with an abiding religious conviction that Bibli-
cal training is essential to the proper inculcation of spirtual and moral
Except as provided in this section, the parent, guardian, or other person
having the care of a child of compulsory school age which child has not been
determined to be incapable of profiting substantially by further instruction shall
cause such child to attend a school which conforms to the minimum standards
prescribed by the state board of education for the full time the school attended
is in session, or shall otherwise cause him to be instructed in accordance with
law ....
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.03 (Page 1972) (emphasis added) (current version in OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.03 (Page Supp. 1976)). Section 3321.07 sets forth special
requirements for nonpublic schools:
If any child attends upon instruction elsewhere than in a public school such
instruction shall be in a school which conforms to the minimum standards
prescribed by the state board of education. The hours and term of attendance
exacted shall be equivalent to the hours and term of attendance required of
children in the public schools of the district. This section does not require a
child to attend a high school instead of a vocational, commercial, or other
special type of school, provided the instruction therein is for a term and for
hours equivalent to those of the high school, and provided his attendance at
such school will not interfere with a continuous program of education for the
child to the age of sixteen.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.07 (Page 1972) (emphasis added). Sections 3321.38 and
3321.99 impose criminal sanctions on parents who violate §§ 3321.03, 3321.07, and other
sections of the compulsory attendance law.
94. 47 Ohio St. 2d at 198, 351 N.E.2d at 760 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972)).
95. Id. at 197, 351 N.E.2d at 760.
96. See notes 60-66 supra and accompanying text.
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values into their youth at a time when such precepts are most likely to
take root--during the formative years of educational growth and phys-
ical development." 97
The appellants next had to demonstrate how the minimum stan-
dards infringed upon the free exercise of their religion. The standards
challenged regulated the subject matter to be taught, the time alloca-
tion for each subject, and the policies to be achieved by the educational
program. In addition, there was a catchall phrase requiring conformity
of all activities to Board policies. The parents contended that these
standards did not allow time for religious training, violated their
beliefs that direction should be sought from God rather than the world,
and that conformity to broad policies acted as a "[b]lank check to the
public authorities to control the entire operation of their school." 98 The
school did not apply for a charter because it would be in essence an
agreement to comply with the standards. 99 The court found that the
minimum standards were neutral on their face but that their application
unduly burdened the appellants' free exercise of religion. The Board's
minimum standards prevented the church school from teaching the
goals and values that motivated the creation of the school. The Chris-
tian parents' religion abided by the Biblical belief of separation from
the world, and, although the state standards might prepare children for
adulthood, the values inherent in them conflicted with appellants'
religious tenets. 100
The finding that Ohio's minimum standards for elementary schools
infringed the parents' religious beliefs is truly an innovation: it is the
first time a court has invalidated a primary school program. According
to the Whisner court, states cannot impose secular values on nonpub-
lic schools by promulgating standards. Basic primary education is a
necessity, but state boards may not allocate instructional time and
subject matter so as to make the teaching of religious principles
impossible.
Justice Celebrezze offered an additional reason for finding the
standards unconstitutional as a whole. Referring to the liberty concept
of Meyer, Pierce, and Farrington, l the Ohio court read Yoder as
recognizing the "fundamental right" of parents to guide their chil-
dren's education. 1 2 The state standards prevented the Christian par-
ents from raising their children as they saw fit. "In the opinion of this
97. 47 Ohio St. 2d at 200, 351 N.E.2d at 762.
98. Id. at 201, 351 N.E.2d at 762.
99. Id. at 201, 351 N.E.2d at 762.
100. Id. at 209-10, 351 N.E.2d at 767.
101. See notes 45-56 supra and accompanying text.
102. 47 Ohio St. 2d at 214, 351 N.E.2d at 769.
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Court a 'general education of a high quality' can be achieved by means
other than the comprehensive regimentation of all academic centers in
the state." 1 3 The combination of the individual's interest in free
exercise of religion and the parents' interest in their children's educa-
tion shifts the burden to the state to show a compelling state interest
that justifies the minimum standards. The Whisner court could not
imagine a sufficiently compelling state interest. 104 This contention
arguably exceeds the Yoder holding and it is questionable whether the
United States Supreme Court or other state courts would reach a
similar conclusion. The net effect of such an analysis is to deny totally
the viability of the state's interest in education.
The Whisner opinion is important to consider in the formulation of
future educational policies because it reflects the movement to limit
state control over educational standards. Policymakers must weigh
both the individual's interest in the free exercise of religion and the
parents' interest in their children's education. State standards for
public education must not impose state philosophies and policies on
individuals whose beliefs are different. Whisner also extends Yoder
so that states must justify the standards and policies imposed on private
primary schools.
E. Scenarios on the Future of Educational Policies
An awareness of the judiciary's perspective on compulsory educa-
tion laws and minimum standards provides educational policymakers
with a backdrop against which to test the legal ramifications of pro-
posed plans. The following three scenarios attempt to develop educa-
tional policies in light of the issues and policy considerations raised in
Yoder and Whisner. They recognize the state's collectivist interest in
education and the pluralistic interest of parents in directing the educa-
tional upbringing-particularly the religious upbringing--of their chil-
dren. Each scenario is a short proposal dramatizing the policy alterna-
tives available to decisionmakers within the bounds of constitutional
acceptability. Each describes a possible educational policy for a hy-
pothetical state; the target is the year 2000.
1. First Scenario: Compulsory Education Laws are Repealed
The state legislature repeals all compulsory education laws, there-
by giving full reign to parental liberty to direct the child's educational
upbringing. The state board of education promulgates minimum stan-
dards for all public and nonpublic schools that request state funding.
103. Id. at 216, 351 N.E.2d at 771.
104. Id. at 218, 351 N.E.2d at 771.
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The standards established affect only nonsectarian educational pro-
grams, and state funding is accordingly limited to these programs. The
goal of elementary education is to provide youth with the basic skills to
enable them to successfully function in society. Secondary education
programs include both academic and vocational training. Education
integrates young. people into the community and exposes them to
experiences that help them to deal with their environment. Statewide
achievement exams and evaluations maintain minimum standards. The
exams and evaluations are optional, but are available for schools that
want to prepare their youth for higher education programs that have
educational prerequisites. Statewide continuing education programs in
citizenship and basic education are available in every district for
interested individuals.
2. Second Scenario: Present Trends in Educational Policy are
Maintained
The state has a strong interest in education. Children are required
to attend school until the age of sixteen. The state board of education
develops reasonable, minimum standards for all educational programs.
All schools and educational programs must be certified by the state
board of education. Parents who do not send their children to an
accredited program are subject to a criminal penalty. Elementary
schools teach youth to be economically self-sufficient and politically
literate. Two-thirds of the school day is devoted to achieving these
goals. Certified teachers are required at the elementary school level.
The goal of secondary education is socialization; therefore, it may be
received in a state accredited institution or by any other means which,
in the discretion of the state board of education, prepares the child for
his role in the community in which he will live. In promulgating
minimum standards for all youth, and in exercising its discretion, the
state carefully considers the pluralistic parental interest in raising
children and the individual's interest in the free exercise of religion.
3. Scenario Three: Compulsory Public Education Laws are Enacted
The state legislature mandates that children under the age of twelve
attend public schools and requires that children under the age of
sixteen attend state approved educational programs. The state has a
compelling interest in education to promote equality of attitudes and
experiences. The state seeks to ensure that each individual is self-
sufficient and has the ability to conform to the norms established by
society. To achieve this goal, public institutional learning prevails for
four hours a day at the elementary school level. The elementary
19783
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classroom experience is limited to basic educational skills. For the
remainder of the school day (a minimum of fifteen hours per week)
students may attend public school programs or private programs cer-
tified by the state board of education. The state provides programs for
all youth, including the mentally and physically handicapped. All
youth between the ages of thirteen and sixteen must attend a state-
approved vocational or academic program. Statewide achievement
exams and evaluations will be required of all youth until the age of
sixteen in order to assure that a basic education is being taught. All
standards set by the state board of education are reasonable and
consider the parents' interest in raising their children and the individu-
al's interest in the free exercise of religion.
F. Linking the Scenarios to Existing Law
As noted earlier, scenarios must stand alone without any authority
so that policymakers can debate their merits without biases based on
the strength of the authority.15 It is assumed, however, that the writer
of the scenarios has substantiated their content in the textual analysis
preceding the scenarios. Case-scenario analysis would end the presen-
tation of the scenarios. For the limited purpose of demonstration,
however, this section is being added to aid the reader in understanding
the thought process behind the creation of the three scenarios presented
above.
The first scenario maximizes the pluralistic interest of parents and
minimizes the state's collectivist interest. 1 6 The courts in both Yoder
and Whisner recognized the legitimate interest of a state in the educa-
tion of its youth. 107 A state board of education can, therefore, prescribe
minimum standards for both public and nonpublic schools. In the first
scenario, education will not be compulsory, and adherence to the
board's minimum standards will only affect state funding. In order not
to infringe upon parental first and fourteenth amendment rights, Whis-
ner requires that these standards be limited to nonsectarian educational
programs. 108
105. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
106. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text. Compare the third scenario in
the text following note 12 supra with the first scenario in text above.
107. See text accompanying notes 89-90, 95 supra. See also text accompanying note
46 supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 101-04 supra. In addition, state funding of the
religious aspects of nonpublic education is clearly prohibited by the first amendment's
nonestablishment prohibition. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1970). See generally
Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 260
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The second scenario is the baseline scenario; it describes where
education will be in the year 2000 if present trends continue. 109 Today
the state may reasonably regulate educational standards. Further,
compulsory education is not per se unconstitutional. This scenario
articulates the primary principles of Whisner and Yoder: (1) criminal
penalties are valid for failure to comply with compulsory schooling
laws,110 (2) a basic education is a necessity for citizenship and self-
sufficiency, n11 and (3) elementary and secondary educational programs
can be held to minimum state standards provided they do not infringe
upon an individual's first amendment right to religious freedom." 2
Finally, the third scenario attempts to take compulsory education
laws to their constitutional limit. It is clear from Yoder that compul-
sory attendance laws are constitutionally valid and that the state may
require attendance at public institutions for elementary education and
attendance by high school-age children at state accredited institutions
or formal, state accredited alternative programs.113 A state's interest in
elementary education is compelling; a state's interest in secondary
education is legitimate but must accommodate the first and fourteenth
amendment rights of parents and children."14 In any event, Whisner
requires that even where education is state-mandated, the state's
control of the educational processes is limited by the parental right to
direct their children's upbringing, guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment, and possibly the first amendment as well." 5
All three scenarios can be linked to the history of educational
policies as determined by the courts; yet each scenario approaches the
issues and policy considerations from a different viewpoint. In addi-
(1968); Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HAiv. L. REV. 1680(1969); Giannel-
la, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part II. The
Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HAtv. L. REv. 513 (1968).
109. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra. Compare the second scenario in the
text following note 12 supra with the second scenario in the text above.
110. This point is implicit in the decisions. Although they invalidated some of the
state requirements, neither court questioned the criminal penalties imposed for violation
of reasonable regulations.
111. The parents in Yoder and Whisner did not contest the importance of a basic
education. See notes 79 & 95 supra and accompanying text.
112. See text accompanying notes 78-79, 100 supra.
113. See notes 79, 84-90 supra and accompanying text. See also Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306(1952) (shared time program releasing public school students for religious
instruction held constitutional).
114. See notes 79, 84-90 supra and accompanying text.
115. See notes 100-04 supra and accompanying text.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tion, all three reflect the scenario writer's understanding of the judicial
perspective of the issues.
III. CONCLUSION
Educational policymaking is grounded on input from a number of
disciplines, and case-scenarios are a means to make educational
policymakers aware of their legal options. Case-scenarios are particu-
larly appropriate in areas, such as education, where the courts have
taken an active role in defining the constitutional limits on state law-
making power and in articulating the policy considerations underlying
their decisions. In formulating new legislation and educational
policies, policymakers can examine case-scenarios developed by legal
commentators to ascertain the legal boundaries for their plans.
The inadequacies of the legal commentators' present role in the
policymaking process is reflected in a recent analysis of the Whisner
decision. 116 The stated purpose of the Case Note was to determine the
scope of the Whisner decision and its effect upon existing minimum
educational standards. 117 After a detailed analysis of the facts, the
holding, and the court's rationales the commentator summarily listed
four courses of action open to the state: "It can cease regulation of
private schools altogether, formulate a separate set of limited standards
for nonpublic schools, construct one limited regulatory scheme for all
schools or take no action whatsoever and face further individual
challenges to the present minimum standards."" 8 The commentator
concluded that "the creation of two sets of standards [was] by far the
most sensible option available to the [state] government."1 9 The Case
Note failed to consider the future consequences of either the Whisner
decision or the four proposed alternatives.
In contrast, scenarios do not render a determination; rather, they
dramatize various policy choices. Case-scenarios encourage policy-
makers to respond to judicial decisions, and leave it up to the policy-
makers to debate all the issues using a variety of inputs. Case-scenario
analysis can effectively help to bridge the gap between the judicial and
policymaking branches of both state and federal governments. The
116. 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 899 (1976).
117. Id. at 899.




judicial system will be able to maintain its limited role as a resolver of
disputes,120 and at the same time be a dynamic system shaping and
reacting to a changing society.
SUSAN W. BRECHER
120. In Yoder, the Chief Justice, writing for the majority, expressly reaffirmed the
Court's limited role with regard to educational policymaking:
Our disposition of this case, however, in no way alters our recognition of the
obvious fact that courts are not school boards or legislators, and are ill-
equipped to determine the "necessity" of discrete aspects of a State's program
of compulsory education. This should suggest that courts must move with great
circumspection in performing the sensitive and delicate task of weighing a
State's legitimate social concern when faced with religious claims for exemp-
tion from generally applicable educational requirements.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,234-35 (1972). Accord, McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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